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Specific performance is conventionally considered the exceptional remedy for 
breach of contract, whereas money damages is considered the normal remedy.
1 Indeed, 
the adequacy doctrine which states that courts will not order specific performance if 
damages would be adequate to protect the expectation interest of the injured party 
(Restatement (Second) of Contracts §359 (1979)) has become “the linchpin of the rules 
governing specific performance in American law.”2  
Moreover, even when parties explicitly agree that their obligations should be 
specifically enforced they usually run into difficulties.
3 The majority of courts have stated 
that a contract with a provision mandating specific performance on its own will not bind 
a court to grant the agreed remedy
4 because the judge maintains discretion to deny 
specific performance even when parties have explicitly provided for this particular 
remedy in their contract.
5  
Yet, in recent years scholars have noted two trends. First, courts have expanded 
their interpretation of situations that do not constitute damages as an adequate remedy, 
thus becoming more liberal in awarding specific performance.
6 Second, even if the 
inclusion of a specific performance clause in a contract may not be binding, it can yet 
play an important role to influence the court to grant specific relief.
7 There is even a 
                                                  
1 Marvin Chirelstein, Concepts and Case Analysis in the Law of Contracts, 163 (2001). 
2 Edward Yorio, Contract Enforcement, Specific Performance and Injunctions, 27 (1989). 
3 Id. at 247; Yorio, supra note 2, at 453 (Although courts seem to have less objection to upholding 
contractual restrictions on specific relief. Id. at 454). 
4 Id. (citing Stokes v. Moore, 262 Ala. 59, 65 (1955)); Steve Thel, 2003 Cumulative Supplement Contract 
Enforcement, Edward Yorio, 192 (2003) (citing Kakaes v. George Washington University, 790 A.2d 581, 
584 (D.C. Ct. App. 2002)). 
5 Kakaes, 790 A.2d at 584. And see the Restatement which sets forth that parties may not vary by an 
agreement the requirement that damages be inadequate as a precursor to achieving equitable relief. Yorio, 
supra note 2, at 441 (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 359, comment a (1979)); Dan Dobbs, Law 
of Remedies, Vol. 3, 270 (1993).  
6 Chirelstein, supra note 1, at 163; Dobbs, supra note 5 at 197. Others have even argued that the adequacy 
test is dead and has little to no effect on the courts’ decisions.  Id.; Douglas Laycock, The Death of the 
Irreparable Injury Rule (1991). 
7 Yorio, supra note 2, at 447; Thel supra note 4, at 197 (citing Finance Auth. v. L.L. Knickerbocker Co., 
106 F. Supp. 2d 44, 52 (D. Me. 1999); Stumpf v. Richardson, 748 So. 2d 1225, 1227 (La. Ct. App. 1999); 
Ludington v. LaFreniere, 704 A.2d 875 (Me. 1997)) ; Dobbs, supra note 5, at 271 (citing Stokes, 262 Ala. 
59 (1955); Presto-X-Co. v. Ewing, 442 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Iowa 1989)). For example, a court may uphold a 
clause for specific performance when the cost of enforcing the equitable relief is low or the court doubts the 
adequacy of other remedies. Yorio, supra note 2, at 447-48. In a close case, a court may be influenced by a 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art71minority approach that provides some authority that clauses for specific performance may 
bind the court regardless of whether the remedy is otherwise appropriate.
8   
Commercial contacts are not much different in this respect. The old section 2-716 
to the UCC (buyer’s right to specific performance or replevin) stated that specific 
performance may be decreed only “where the goods are unique or in other proper 
circumstances.” This may change soon though, as in May 2003 the ALI approved 
amendments to section 2-716.
9 It is expected that enactment of these provisions in state 
legislatures will be sought.10 One of the major changes to section 2-716 expands the 
remedies that the buyer is entitled to. Specifically, the new section 2-716 reads that in 
non-consumer contracts,
11 “specific performance may be decreed if the parties have 
agreed to that remedy.”
12 The preliminary official comments state that “the parties’ 
agreement for specific performance can be enforced even if legal remedies (i.e. damages) 
are entirely adequate.”
13  
The ALI has approved another change to the UCC which is relevant to this paper. 
The new section 2-718 (liquidation or limitation of damages; deposits) eliminated the 
requirements that in non-consumer contracts a party seeking to enforce a liquidated 
damages term had to demonstrate the difficulty of proving the loss and the inconvenience 
or nonfeasibility of obtaining an adequate remedy, thus giving more weight to parties’ ex-
ante stipulated damages, vis-à-vis other court-imposed ex-post damages.
14  
                                                                                                                                                    
contract between parties that states that that the product or service is unique or that money damages are 
inadequate. Id. at 448.  Thel, supra note 4, at 198 (citing Peuse v. Malkuch, 911 P.2d 1153 (Mont. 1996)). 
8 Thel, supra note 4, at 198 (citing Media General Broadcasting v. Pappas Telecasting, 152 F.Supp. 2d 
865, 869 (W.D. N.C. 2001) (stating that despite the sufficiency of money damages, the parties may choose 
their remedies in line with their particular needs)). 
9 The title of 2-716 has been changed to “Specific performance; Buyer’s right to replevin”.  
10 These amendments were previously approved by the NCCUSL on August 2002, so the NCCUSL  can 
seek enactment in state legislatures. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Laws 
(NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALI) are jointly responsible for drafting, updating and 
promulgating the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 
11 For consumer contracts the major remedy remained damages.  
12 Cite.  
13 Cite.  
14 Preliminary official comments, section 2. Another related change is the elimination of the part in section 
2-718 which stated that unreasonably large liquidated damages are void as penalty. As a result the only 
relevant criterion is whether the liquidated damages are reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual harm 
caused by the breach. As the preliminary comment explains, “a liquidated damages term that provided for 
damages that unreasonably small is likewise unenforceable”. Preliminary official comments, section 3. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressThese two changes- that the parties' stipulated damages clause and their 
agreement for specific performance will be enforced by courts – have been advocated for 
years by legal economists.
15 But if parties' specific performance and stipulated damages 
clauses will indeed be enforced by courts, then one may reasonably estimate that the 
parties' agreement to give the promisee upon breach the option to choose the remedy will 
also be enforced by courts. Indeed if these remedies are enforced when parties write them 
into the contract at the time of entering the contractual relationship, why wouldn't they be 
enforced if parties explicitly agreed to let the promisee decide at a later time (upon 
breach) which of these remedies to receive? Thus, for example, we estimate that a 
contract which allows the promisee to decide unilaterally and upon breach whether to 
enforce specific performance or receive expectation damages will likely be enforced. 
Similarly, a contract which allows the promisee to decide unilaterally and upon breach 
whether to enforce the stipulated damages clause or receive instead specific performance 
may also be enforced. If we are right in our estimation, then the doctrinal changes 
mentioned above may allow for more room for contract design than previously thought. 
If we are wrong, then this paper should be read as making a normative, and not a positive, 
claim.  
In this paper we consider two models which take advantage of the two important 
changes mentioned above. In both models the court is required to honor parties’ ex-ante 
stipulation that the choice of remedy will be determined by the buyer upon breach. 
Specifically, in the first model our new proposed rule allows the parties to stipulate ex-
ante that the buyer will choose, ex-post upon the breach of the contract and not ex-ante at 
the date where parties enter the contract, whether she wants specific performance or pre-
determined liquidated damages. In the second model parties stipulate ex-ante that in case 
of anticipatory breach the buyer will choose ex-post whether she wants specific 
performance or expectation damages.  
We focus on the ex-ante design of the contract in light of new information that is 
expected to  arrive and therefore assume  that  no renegotiation or investments are 
                                                  
15 Tom Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of 
Contract Remedies, 83 MICH L. REV. 341; Charles Goetz & Robert Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties 
and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and Theory of Efficient 
Breach,  77 COLUM L. REV. 554 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art71involved. 16 Our main focus in this paper is the way that parties can plan ahead and design 
a contract that will take advantage of some of the new information they will receive after 
the contract is signed, when the ex post renegotiation is very costly.  In both models 
presented in this paper we propose contract-clauses that take advantage of the 
information that the Seller and the Buyer receive between the time they entered the 
contract and the time of the actual breach.  
We further suggest that courts would, or at least should, honor such clauses. We 
argue that the developments in the law identified above allow us to estimate that the 
proposed clauses (at least in the first model) may be employed by parties and honored by 
courts.   
In section two we present a simple model with two-sided incomplete information 
with liquidated damages clause. In section three we present a similar model with 
expectation damages. We compare the performance of these new proposed legal regime 
with current legal regimes and then determine the conditions at which the new regimes 
should be applied.  
The appendix provides a more rigorous mathematical treatment of our model.  
 




                                                  
16 Indeed, in an environment of asymmetric information renegotiation costs are high.  
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1.1 The setting.  
 
At Time 1 a Seller-supplier and a Buyer-manufacturer (both are risk-neutral) enter 
a contract for the sale of a single unit of indivisible goods that the Buyer-manufacturer 
needs for its production of the ultimate products. The Seller receives the money upon 
performance, that is, when he supplies the good sometime in the future, call it Time 2. 
Among other things, the parties agree on a price and liquidated damages to be paid in 
case the Seller does not deliver in Time 2. There is uncertainty about Seller’s cost of 
production due to future fluctuations in the market prices for the inputs for the materials 
the seller promised to deliver. Thus it is assumed that Seller’s costs, C, is drawn from a 
density function f(C) with cumulative density function denoted F(C) in the 
interval[ C C, ]. There is also uncertainty about Buyer’s valuation of the contract due to 
future fluctuations in the market prices of the products the Buyer ultimately manufactures 
and sells. Thus, it is assumed that Buyer’s valuation, V, is drawn from a density function 
g(V) with cumulative density function denoted G(V) in the interval[ V V, ], where G(.) 
and F(.) are independent. This two-side uncertainty  at Time 1  is what makes the 
determination of liquidated damages difficult. What is clear, however, is that by the time 
the parties’ dispute will be deliberated in courts, call it Time 3, both parties will have 
learned the new market prices. The Seller will know his costs and the Buyer’s her 
valuation. The following chart presents the timeline.  
 
Chart 1- Time line for the model with liquidated damages.  
 
1____________________________________2_________________________3 
Parties      Parties learn      Seller      Court decides   
enter a     new information     delivers    and parties obey   
contract          or not       
 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art71At Time 1,  the Seller and the Buyer are symmetrically uninformed about each 
other’s as well as their own valuation. They  enter a contract with a price, p, and 
liquidated damages clause, D. For simplicity we assume that the Buyer  has the entire 
bargaining power so the Seller’s surplus from the contract is assumed to be zero. This 
entails that the Buyer can dictate both the price, p, and the amount of the liquidated 
damages, D.
17  
We note that the price and liquidated damages written in the contract are 
correlated and reflect the legal regime employed by the courts that the parties are 
expected to face at Time 3, if the Seller does not deliver at Time 2. Importantly, we allow 
the parties to decide in Time 1 about the mechanism by which the liquidated damages 
will be paid upon breach.  This will be called either a Regular Legal Regime (RLR) or an 
Option to Enforce Regime (OER). More on this below.  
 In the interim period between Time 1 and Time 2, both parties learn their true 
valuation but cannot make any changes to the contract between them (no renegotiation 
after Time 1).18 Possible justifications for the parties learning more about their true 
valuation only after Time 1 is that new information that was unknown before (but which 
was anticipated to be known later) is now revealed. For example, the Seller learned his 
exact cost of performance after OPEC withdrew its threat to raise oil prices, or, the Buyer 
learned that the product she intends to manufacture was approved by some federal agency 
for distribution in the US, and so forth.  
At Time 2 the Seller, after learning his exact cost of performance, decides 
whether to deliver the good. In making his decision the Seller takes into account the price 
and liquidated damages agreed upon in Time 1 and the legal regime parties are expected 
to face at Time 3, if the Seller does not deliver. 
At Time 3 the court does not hear evidence about the damages that the breach of 
the promise to deliver caused but rather always enforces the agreement between the 
parties, including the legal regime parties agreed on. Specifically, at Time 3, there are 
two possible regimes that the court can apply. First, a RLR, in which if the Seller decides 
to breach he pays damages that are equal to the liquidated damages,  R D . We call it 
                                                  
17 Nothing in the result hinges on this assumption.  
18 Will introduce renegotiation later on in the model.  
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liquidated damages. Second, an OER, in which the Buyer can insist on getting specific 
performance over receiving damages that are equal to O D . If the Buyer chooses specific 
performance, the Seller must deliver. If the Buyer chooses to get the liquidated damages, 
the Seller can then pay the liquidated damages. Simply put, under an OER the Buyer 
chooses, upon breach, whether to get specific performance or the liquidated damages. At 
Time 3, when the Buyer makes her decisions, the Seller’s realized cost of performance is 
not observable to the Buyer or verifiable to the court.
19    
We now compare the incentives to breach and p arties’ expected payoffs under 




1.2.1 Regular Liability Regime.  
When the legal regime is RLR, (that is when the Seller can choose in Time 3 whether 
to deliver or breach and pay the liquidated damages), the Buyer offers the seller in Time 
1 a take-it-or-leave-it contract ( R R D p , ), where  R p is the price under RLR and  R D  is the 
liquidated damages under RLR. Price is payable upon performance. The seller will get 
C pR - if she performs,  and ( R D - ) if she breaches. Therefore, she will breach  if 
R R D p C + > . If the contract is accepted by the seller, the buyer will get expected payoff 
which is equal to: 
R R R R R R
B
R D D p F p V E D p F v )] ( 1 [ ] ) ( )[ ( + - + - + =       (1) 
 
The seller’s expected payoff (if she accepts the contract) is: 
                                                  
19 This is a major difference between our model and the models considered in the literature on incomplete 
contracts. Like other models in the literature we assume that parties in Time 1 only observe each other‘s 
distributions. In addition to that we also assume that parties do not know their own valuation, but rather 
have only an estimate of it. Parties in this sense are symmetrically uninformed: they both observe nothing 
but their own and each other’s distributions. No private information exists. In Time 2 asymmetry of 
information is introduced. Parties learned their own valuation but still cannot observe (and definitely not 
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S
R
D C CdF D p D p F
D D p F D p C C E p D p F v
R R
- - + + =
- + - + + £ - + =
￿
+
) ( ) )( (
) )]( ( 1 [ )] / ( )[ (
       (2) 
Seller’s “participation constraint” (or “individual rationality” constraint) requires the 
Buyer to offer a contract ) , ( R R D p  that will maximize Buyer’s payoff while ensuring the 
Seller’s payoff being non-negative:  
Max  ) , ( R R
B
R D p v  s.t.  0 ‡
S
R v . 
By assumption, the Buyer has the entire bargaining power and therefore can 
extract the entire ex-ante surplus, which  entails that the participation constraint is 
binding. Note however that  ex-post the seller might get some positive payoff 
(informational rent) because he possesses private information about his by then realized 
production cost. 
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Comments:  
(a) Proof in the appendix.  
(b) It is a standard result in contract theory that expectation damages (under RLR) 
induce optimal level of breach. But these models generally assume one-sided 
uncertainty, eg. Miceli (1997, p 73).  
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press(c) Observe that  R R p V E D - = ) (  means that the liquidated damages that the Buyer 
offers equal the expected expectation damages. Thus, although from the ex-ante 
perspective the liquidated damages induce optimal level of breach; this does not 
guarantee an optimal level of breach from the ex-post perspective. Specifically, in 
this case the Seller breaches whenever ) (V E C ‡ , this is inefficient in cases where 
) (V E C V > > . Conversely, the seller will deliver whenever ) (V E C < , this is 
inefficient when  ) (V E C V < < .  
 
 
1.2.2 Option to Enforce Regime. 
 
When the legal regime is OER, (that is when the Buyer can insist upon breach on 
specific performance), the Buyer offers the seller in Time 1 a take-it-or-leave-it contract 
( O O D p , ), where O p   is the price under OER and  O D  is the liquidated damages under 
RLR. Price is payable upon performance. If the Buyer insists on delivery, she gets 
O p V - , if she agrees to breach, she gets  O D . Therefore, the Buyer will insist on delivery 
if  O O D p V + ‡ , and will agree to the breach otherwise. The Seller will get  C pO - if he 
performs,  O D -  if she breaches. Therefore, he will breach if  O O D p C + > . 
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As before, Seller’s “participation constraint” requires the Buyer to offer a contract 
( O O D p , ) that will maximize Buyer’s payoff while ensuring the Seller’s payoff being 
non-negative:  
 
Max  ) , ( O O
B
O D p v s.t.  0 ‡
S
O v  
The first order condition is: 
0 ) ( )] ( 1 )[ ( ) (
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With some machinery we derive Lemma A2 and Lemma A3:  
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Where 
* *
O O D p + is the solution to the foc stated above.  
 
Interestingly, under OER the breach-threshold,  O O D p + , can be larger or smaller than 
the breach threshold under RLR, which was E(V). Lemma A3 determines the conditions 
at which the threshold under OER will be larger than the threshold under RLR.  
 
Lemma A3   
If  
))] ( / ( ) ( ))[ ( ( )) ( ( )] ( )) ( / ( ))][ ( ( 1 ))[ ( ( V E V V E V E V E G V E f V E V E C C E V E F V E g £ - < - ‡ -
,  then  ). (
* * V E D p O O < +  
 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressComments:  
(a) Proof in the appendix.  
(b) Notice that our result is different from Stole (1992). Stole showed that the 
efficient stipulated damages are always under-compensatory (and thus the 
penalty doctrine is justified). He showed in other words that 
) (
* * V E D p O O < + always holds. Yet, in our model this result does not 
always hold. If the condition is not satisfied we might have over-
compensatory damages (even before considering the strategic effect of 
third parties, see Edlin and Schwartz (2003) for a concise summary of the 
literature). The difference between our paper and Stole's is due to the 
different informational structure and the new proposed  OER which Stole 
does not consider.  
 
Interestingly, under OER the breach-threshold, there can be more or less breaches than 
under RLR. Lemma A4 determines the conditions at which OER will induce less 
breaches than RLR.  
 
 
Lemma A4 If  ), (




(c) Proof in the appendix.  
 
The question that we are left with is whether RLR or OER yields a higher joint payoff. 
Proposition 1 summarizes.  
 
Proposition 1:  
In a regime of double-sided uncertainty where parties  specific performance and 
liquidated damages clauses  are honored,  OER is Pareto superior to RLR, 
if )) ( / ( )) ( / ( V E C C E V E V V E ‡ > ‡ .  
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art71 
Comments:  
(a) Proof in the appendix.  
(b)  Observe that for OER to dominate RLR the Buyer’s expected valuation should be 
greater than Seller’s expected cost, conditioned that both  values are higher than E(V). 
Recall from Lemma A1 above that E(V) is the threshold for optimal breach under RLR. 
Indeed, under RLR, whenever the Seller’s costs are higher than this threshold, he will 
breach the contract.  
(c) Proposition 1 states that  OER Pareto dominates RLR whenever Buyer’s mean-
valuation above the RLR breach-threshold is higher than the Seller’s mean-costs above 
that threshold. Indeed,  in that case, from the ex-ante perspective, performance is more 
likely to be efficient than breach. Under these circumstances shifting from RLR to OER, 
and thus providing the Buyer with the option to insist on performance,  is efficiency-
enhancing.  
 (d) In the special case of uniform distributions, where C is distributed ] , [ s s U S S + - m m , 
and V is distributed  ] , [ b b U B B + - m m , the condition  stated in Proposition 1 can be 
reduced to:  b s S B - > - m m . This means that  OER dominates RLR whenever the 
difference between parties’ means is larger than the half of the difference in their ranges. 
Observe that the range is a proxy for the uncertainty in the Buyer’s ultimate valuation and 
the Seller’s ultimate costs. Thus for OER to not dominate RLR, the Seller’s uncertainty 
should be larger than the Buyer’s uncertainty, and this excess uncertainty should be larger 
than the initial mean advantage that the Buyer has over the Seller.
20 The intuition for this 
result is simple. Observe that  OER leads to more performance than RLR. Given the 
Buyer’s larger ex-ante mean, this is a move in the right direction. Yet, sometimes the 
Seller’s range of costs can be so large, that he is likely to end up having very high costs. 
In that case it is better not perform the contract. The condition  b s S B - > - m m  defines 
the balance between these two effects- the mean effect and the range effect.  
(e) Because neither of the legal regimes is unconditionally superior, courts should allow 
the parties to choose the type of legal regime they prefer. Specifically, the Buyer should 
                                                  
20 Ex-ante, the Buyer has always a larger mean-valuation then the Seller’ mean costs. Otherwise, risk 
neutral parties would have never entered the contract in the first place.  
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Pressbe  allowed to offer the Seller either an RLR-like take-it-or-leave it contract, with  
R R D p , , or an  OER-like contract with  O O D p , . The Seller is indifferent as his expected 
payoff is always zero. But for the Buyer it does matter. As the Buyer can observe both 
distributions in Time 1, she will prefer the  O O D p ,  contract whenever the condition stated 
in Proposition 1 is met; otherwise she will prefer the R R D p ,  contract. Buyer's choice of 
contracts renders this mechanism to be always Pareto superior to the current RLR regime. 
Proposition 2 summarizes: 
 
Proposition 2 
In a regime of double-sided uncertainty where parties specific performance and 
liquidated damages clauses are honored, the mechanism defined in comment (d) above is 
Pareto superior to RLR.  
 
2.3 A simple numerical example  
 
Suppose that due to the fluctuations in the market prices of the inputs, the Seller’s 
cost of production, at Time 1, is normalized to be drawn from the uniform distribution 
f(.)= uniform [10,70]. Similarly, due to fluctuations in the market prices of the products 
the Buyer ultimately manufactures and sells, the Buyer’s best estimate of her valuation, at 
Time 1, is normalized to be drawn from the uniform distribution g(.)=uniform [30,90]. 
This is each side’s Time 1 estimation of its own valuation of the contract, as well as of 
the other party’s valuation. Observe that risk neutral parties will enter the contract 
because Buyer’s mean valuation, 60, is larger than Seller’s mean production costs, 40.  
Observe that without uncertainty over Buyer's valuation, and assuming all 
bargaining power is at the Buyer’s hands, the contract price would have been 40, the 
liquidated damages 20, the Buyer’s expected payoff 20, and the Seller’s expected payoff 
zero.  With two-sided uncertainty the analysis is more complicated. Table 1 compares the 
two legal regimes discussed.  
 




D  p  V(b)  V(s) 
RLR    20.83  39.17  20.83  0 
OER  11.11  38.89  22.22  0 
 
Table 1 shows that the Buyer in Time 1 will prefer to switch from RLR to  OER. 
The Seller is indifferent. In return to receiving a somewhat lower price ex-ante  (38.89 
instead of 39.17) he gets a large discount in the damages he might need to pay in case of 
a breach. As can be seen, while maintaining Seller’s payoff constant, the Buyer’s 
expected payoff increased, making the switch a Pareto improvement.
21  
One may wonder whether the change in  the joint  payoff from 20.83 to 22.22 is 
important. Yet the reader should be aware that this is a 6.67% increase in the joint payoff 
just from writing a better contract. Moreover, the switch from specific performance to 
liquidated damages, a widely celebrated change by legal economists, yields a 4.1% 
increase in the joint payoff.
22  
 
2.  The model- Anticipatory breach with court-imposed expectation damages 
 
2.1 The setting.  
 
The model is similar to the previous model with few changes. At Time 1 parties 
do not write a liquidated damages clause. Instead they agree on what would happen in 
case of Seller’s anticipatory breach in Time 2. At Time 2 the Seller repudiates. At Time 3 
there is a trial where the court tries to verify Buyer’s valuation in order to determine the 
expected damages. At Time 4 the court announces the damages and the Seller decides 
whether to breach or not. Between Time 3 and Time 4 the Buyer learns her realized 
valuation.  
The following chart presents the time-line.  
                                                  
21 As shown in Lemma A2 in the appendix, the damages under OER contract will sometimes be over-
compensatory and sometimes under-compensatory.  
22 Observe that under RLR the Seller agrees to a contract price of $39.17, which is below his mean costs. 
This is because the Seller knows that in the state of the word in which his costs are high (C>60) she does 
not have to perform and can get away with paying only $20.83.  
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Chart 2- Time line for the model with expectation damages.  
 
1____________________2____________3________________________________4 
Parties       Seller learns     Seller signals      Buyer reports        Buyer learns     Court decides   
enter a      his cost     anticipatory     her valuation        her valuation     and parties make   
contract         breach                  at trial           decisions 
 
At Time 1, the Seller and the Buyer enter a contract with a price, p. As before we 
assume that the Buyer has the entire bargaining power so the Seller’s surplus from the 
contract is assumed to be zero. As before we note that the price written in the contract 
reflects the ex-post legal regime employed by the courts and which the parties are 
expected to face at Time 4.  
At Time 2 the Seller, after learning his exact cost of performance, may decide to 
repudiate. At Time 3 there is a trial upon which the court learns about Buyer’s valuation 
and determines the expectation damages.  
We need to comment on the way the court determines the Buyer’s expectation 
damages. By the time of the trial we assume that the Buyer still does not know h er 
ultimate valuation, which she would learn only between Time 3 and T ime 4. Thus, at 
Time 3  the Buyer presents evidence to mislead the court about her valuation. 
Simplistically, we assume that she can totally mislead the court about her valuation. At 
Time 3, based on the Buyer’s evidence presented to the court, the court decides about the 
expectation damages that the breach caused. Then, after the trial, yet still before Time 4, 
the Buyer learns her realized valuation.
23 
At Time 4, there are two possible legal regimes. Under RLR, the Seller needs to 
pay the court-imposed damages if he decides not to deliver. Under OER, the Buyer, (who 
has learned her true valuation), decides whether she prefers specific performance or the 
court’s imposed damages.   
We now compare the incentives to breach and parties’ expected payoffs under 
RLR versus under OER.  
                                                  
23 Alternatively, parties agree in Time 1 that in case of an anticipatory breach the Buyer can submit to the 




2.2.1 RLR with expectation damages.  
When the legal regime is RLR, (that is when the Seller has to pay the court-imposed 
expectation damages in Time 4), the Buyer offers the Seller in Time 1 a take-it-or-leave-
it contract (
R p ), where 
R p  is the price under RLR. Price is payable upon performance. 
The Seller will get  C P
R - if she performs, (
R D - ) if she breaches. 
R D  is the expectation 
damages that the court determines based on Buyer’s evidence; 
R D =
R V ~ - R p , where 
R V ~  
is the court’s estimate of Buyer’s valuation based on Buyer’s misleading evidence. 
Therefore, the Seller will breach if C>
R V ~ . Between Time 2 and Time 3 the Buyer 
chooses evidence to mislead the court to determine 
R V ~  in a way that will maximize her 
expected payoff.  
R R R R R R R R R R
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With some machinery we derive Lemma A5:  
 
Lemma A5  
Under RLR with Court-Imposed Expectation Damages,  
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Comments:  
(a) Proof in the appendix.  










V F - >0, (the 
inverse of the hazard rate), which is traditionally assumed in the literature to be 
decreasing with 
* ~R V . This reflects the intuition that the Buyer will try to get more 
than her expected valuation, which she is guaranteed even without misleading the 
court.  
(c) Observe that the seller will breach whenever  ) (
~ *
V E V C
R > > . Thus, from the ex-
ante perspective, there is under-breach relative to the social optimum. Recall that 
the previous model of liquidated damages induced efficient breach from the ex-
ante perspective. (The seller breached whenever  ) (
* * V E D p C R R = + > .) 
(d) From the ex-post perspective, there is under-breach if 
* ~ R V V < , and over-breach 
if 
* ~ R V V > . Recall that the previous model of  liquidated damages that did not 
induce efficient breach from the ex-post perspective.  
 
2.2.2 OER with expectation damages.  
 
When the legal regime is OER, (that is when the Buyer can insist on specific 
performance), the Buyer offers the Seller in Time 1 a take-it-or-leave-it contract (
O p ), 
where 
O p  is the price under OER. Price is payable upon performance.  If in Time 4 the 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art71Buyer insists o n delivery, she gets 
O p V - ; if she agrees to the breach, she 
gets
O O O p V D - =
~ , where 
O V ~  is the court’s Time 3 estimate of Buyer’s valuation based 
on Buyer’s misleading evidence. Therefore, the Buyer will insist on delivery if 
O V V ~ ‡ , 
and will agree to the breach otherwise. The Seller will get  C p
O - if he ends up 
performing, and (
O D - ) if he ends up breaching. The Seller would have wanted to breach 
anytime C>
O V ~ . 
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With some machinery we derive Lemmas A6 and A12 (see appendix):  
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We were interested to explore whether one regimes leads the Buyer to be less aggressive 
in misleading the court. Lemma A8 summarizes.  
 
Lemma A8  
* * ~ ~ R M V V < . 
 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressComments:  
(a) Proof in the appendix.  
(b) Lemma 8 states that under OER the Buyer will be less aggressive in misleading 
the court.  
 
Unfortunately, the fact that OER provides better incentives to mislead the court does not 
render OER to be always superior to RLR. Proposition 3 summarizes:  
 
      Proposition 3:  
If Assumption A2 (see Appendix) holds then a sufficient condition for OER to be Pareto 





* * M M V C C E V V V E ‡ > ‡ .  
Comments:  
(a) proof in the appendix.  
(b) Assumption A2 ensures that under OER when facing an anticipatory breach and 
required to provide evidence about her valuation, the Buyer will inflate and not deflate 
her valuation. 




2.3 A simple numerical example  
 
As before Seller’s cost of production, at Time 1, is normalized to be drawn from 
the uniform distribution f(.)= uniform [10,70]. Buyer’s best estimate of her valuation, at 
Time 1, is normalized to be drawn from the uniform distribution g(.)=uniform [30,90]. 






http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art71Table 2- A Comparison of the Legal Regimes – expectation damages 
 
Applicable Rule  D  P  V(b)  V ~   V(s) 
RLR    20.83  39.79  20.62  65  0 
OER  17.82  38.85  22.47  56.67  0 
 
Table 1 shows that indeed that V ~
 is smaller under OER than under RLR, which 
entails that the Buyer’s “lie” to the court in Time 3 is smaller under OER.  Observe that 
the Buyer in Time 1 can bribe the Seller to agree to switch from RLR to OER in return 
for Seller’s lost control over the remedy. The bribe is in  the amount of the expectation 
damages clause. (Yet, the Buyer pays a lower price). As can be seen, while maintaining 
Seller’s payoff constant, the Buyer’s expected payoff increased, making the switch a 
Pareto improvement. Observe that the joint payoff is nine percent larger under OER than 
under RLR.  
 
3. Summary and Future Research.  
 
In this paper we showed that with two-sided uncertainty parties can still do better 
themselves through contract-design than was previously thought. The basic idea in both 
models is simple: let parties postpone the choice of remedy to a later time when they 
already learned the new information. In the current legal regime parties predetermine the 
remedy while still uncertain about their valuations. 
 In between the two models discussed above we believe that the first one is more 
likely to be enforce by courts, assuming  the new proposed changes in the UCC will  be 
accepted. If courts in the future will respect liquidated damages clause and specific 
performance clause, we estimate they are likely to respect a clause which lets the 
aggrieved party to choose upon breach whether she prefers the liquidated damages or 
performance.  In his  new book chapter on the economic analysis of contracts Steve 
Shavell argues that when courts are not able to determine the value of performance, 
parties will often want to write a liquidated damages clause. Shavell then mentions this 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Presswould not be an option for the parties if the value of performance to the buyer  is 
uncertain. As an example Shavell says that “if the value of having a factory constructed 
on time will vary, due to market conditions for the product the buyer is going to produce 
in the factory, then the parties cannot specify the damages to be paid in advance.”
24 In 
this paper we demonstrate that parties do have ways to solve this problem. We proposed a 
contract-clause  which does that and argued that it is  sometimes  superior to the 
conventional alternatives. The new clause  takes advantage of the information that the 
Seller and the Buyer receive between the time they entered the contract and the time of 
the breach. With the new changes in the law, especially in the UCC, we expect to find 
parties that employ the mechanism proposed in the paper.  
In the future we plan to take the following steps to enrich our models: 
a)  In the models presented above, we considered only a possible breach by 
the Seller. We plan to study cases where the Buyer as well can breach.  
b)  In this paper we assumed that parties cannot  renegotiate after the 
uncertainty is resolved. This assumption is not that simplistic as that 
negotiation will be under asymmetric information, a non-easy task by 
all means. We  nevertheless  plan  to study the performance of  OER 
compared to RLR assuming negotiation is possible, albeit costly.  
c)  In this paper we did not take into account investments parties may need 
to make. We plan to do it in the next draft.  
d)  In this paper we did not consider strategic behavior by to deter entry by 
3
rd parties. We plan to do it in the next draft.   
 
                                                  
24 Discussion Paper No. 403, 02/2003. Footnote 77 and the text around it.   
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4.1 General  
 
 
Buyer (B or she) and Seller (S or he) are trading an indivisible good. Seller’s cost C is 
random over the interval ] , [ C C , with distribution ) (C F . Buyer’s value V is distributed 
according to ) (V G  over the interval ] , [ V V . F(.) and G(.) are independent and common 
knowledge.  ) ( ) ( C E V E ‡ (There are trading opportunities ex ante.).  
 
We focus our attention on the ex-ante design of the contract in light of expected future 
new information and therefore assume no renegotiation or investments are involved. We 
study a model with unilateral possible breach by the Seller.  
 
Technical Assumptions:  
 
1)  Throughout the paper, we will o nly consider interior solutions (we 
assume the second-order conditions in the optimization problems are 
satisfied). 
2)  We assume the optimal solution is unique. 
3)   The following is a standard Monotone Hazard Rate assumption we will 
use in our analysis:  










 are decreasing in x. 
4)  Subscripts  O (R) denote values under  OER (RLR) in the liquidated 
damages model. Superscripts O (R) denote values under OER (RLR) 
in the court-imposed expectation damages model. 
 
 
Legal Regimes comparisons- Under Regular Legal Regime (RLR), Seller has the right to 
breach if he pays the damages to the Buyer. Under Option to Enforce Regime (OER ) the 
Buyer has an option to insist, upon breach, on performance. While under RLR, only the 
Seller can take advantage of his future private information, under OER both parties can 
take advantage of their future private valuations.  
 
 







Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press4.2 Stipulated Damages Model 
 
The RLR Contract 
 
Time Line- At Time 1, when the parties sign the contract, they do not know their exact 
valuation and cost, but only know their distributions; At time 1.5, parties learn their 
private information. In Time 2 the Seller decides whether or not to deliver the good. At 
Time 3, the court enforces the contract parties signed in Time 1.  
 
Under Regular Legal Regime (RLR), Seller has the right to breach if he pays the damages 
to the Buyer. We assume that the Buyer makes the Seller a take-it-or-leave-it offer with a 
fixed price and liquidated damages, ( R R D p , )
25. The price,  R p , is payable upon 
performance. The seller will get  C pR - if he performs,  R D -  if he breaches. Therefore, 
he will breach if  R R D p C + > . ( R R D p +  is the breach-threshold) 
 
If the contract is accepted by the seller, the buyer will get expected payoff: 
R R R R R R
B
R D D p F p V E D p F v )] ( 1 [ ] ) ( )[ ( + - + - + =     (1) 
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  (2) 
The buyer can chose ( R R D p + ) to maximize the joint payoff, and then manipulate the 
price of the contract and guarantee Seller's zero expected payoff. (Of course, ex post the 
seller might get some positive surplus as his informational rent, since he possesses private 













R D p C CdF V E D p F v v Max ) ( ) ( ) (  
 
Taking  the first-order condition and setting the seller’s expected payoff as zero, the 
equilibrium conditions are: 
                   
                                                  
25 We assume that the buyer has all the bargaining power, however, our results do not hinge on this 
assumption since we focus on the joint payoff under the different legal regimes. In this paper, we only 
consider simple contracts with fixed price and damages. Stole (1992) applies a mechanism design approach 
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R p  and 
*
R D   are directly derived from (3). Plugging 
*
R p  and 
*
R D  into (1), we get 
the buyer’s equilibrium payoff 
* B
R v .  QED. 
 
Observe in first equation in Lemma A1, that  R R p V E D - = ) ( , i.e., in equilibrium, the 
contract will set expected expectation damages.  
 
Example: If both parties' distributions are drawn from U[0,100], then 
*
R D =12.5, 
*
R p =37.5,  =
* B
R v 12.5. If F is U[10,70] and G is U[30,90], then 
*
R D =20.83, 
*
R p =39.17, 
=
* B
R v 20.83.) 
 
The OER Contract 
Under Option to Enforce Regime (OER ) the Buyer has an option to insist, upon breach, 
on performance. We assume that Buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer ( O O D p , ) to the 
Seller. If upon breach the Buyer insists on performance, Buyer gets O p V - ; if she does 
not insist on performance she gets O D . Therefore, the Buyer will insist on performance if 
O O D p V + ‡ , and agree to the liquidated damages otherwise. 
 
If the Seller performs, he gets C pO - . If the Seller breaches he gets  ) ( O D - . Hence, 
if O O D p C + ‡ , the Seller will prefer to breach, otherwise he will deliver. Thus, 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press) ( O O D p +  is the breach-threshold. Observe that under OER, the Seller can no longer 
unilaterally decide on breach. If the Buyer insists on performance the Seller will have to 
perform. He expected payoff therefore when he attempts to breach is 
) )]( ( 1 [ ) )( ( C p D p G D D p G O O O O O O - + - + - + , and not  ) ( O D - . 
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As before, the buyer can chose  ) ( O O D p +  to maximize the joint payoff, and then 
manipulate the price of the contract and guarantee Seller's zero expected payoff. 
 
) ( ) ( ) (
) ( )] ( 1 [ ) ( ) (
C E C CdF D p G






















The first-order condition is: 
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The interpretation of (8) is that the breach threshold,  O O D p + , is the weighted sum of the 
lower-than-threshold truncated Buyer's expected value and the higher-than-threshold 
truncated Seller's expected cost.  
For example, i f C is distributed  ] , [ s s U S S + - m m , and V is distributed 
] , [ b b U B B + - m m , then we derive from (8):  2 / )] ( ) [(
* * b s D p B S O O - + + = + m m . The 
optimal threshold point is the midpoint of the Buyer’s lower-bound and Seller’s upper-
bound distributions. It is the midpoint of the specific intersection of parties' distributions 
in which the uncertainty whether Buyer's valuation or Seller's costs exist. (In all other 
parties' distributions, the choice is easy). The following diagram represents it: 
  
               b                      b 
                s               s        
 
 
Setting the Seller’s expected payoff to be zero gives us another equilibrium condition: 
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] ( 1 [
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, where 
* *
O O D p +  is the solution to equation (7). 
Proof: From equation (9) we derive 
*
O p , plugging it back into (5) we get this expression 
for
* B
O v .  QED.  
 
 
Example: If F is U[10,70], G is U[30,90], then  22 . 22 , 11 . 11 , 89 . 38
* * * = = =
B
O O O v D p . 
Observe that 
* *









Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressInterestingly, under OER, the breach threshold,  O O D p + , can be larger or smaller than 
the breach threshold under RLR, which was E(V). Lemma A3 determines the conditions 
at which the threshold under OER will be larger than the threshold under RLR.  
 
Lemma A3   
If  
))] ( / ( ) ( ))[ ( ( )) ( ( )] ( )) ( / ( ))][ ( ( 1 ))[ ( ( V E V V E V E V E G V E f V E V E C C E V E F V E g £ - < - ‡ -
,  then  ). (
* * V E D p O O < +  
 
Proof:  First order condition, (7), can be rewritten as: 
0 )] / ( ) )[( ( ) (
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))] ( / ( ) ( ))[ ( ( )) ( ( )] ( )) ( / ( ))][ ( ( 1 ))[ ( ( V E V V E V E V E G V E f V E V E C C E V E F V E g £ - < - ‡ -
, then  0 )) ( ( < G V E . Second-order condition in the maximization problem implies that 
0 < G¢ , hence we have  ). (
* * V E D p O O < +                         Q.E.D 
 
Remarks: 1. Lemma A3 says that if at the critical damage value  ) (V E (optimal breach 
threshold under RLR), Seller’s expected cost savings from breach (the forgone expected 
cost of performance minus the damages that he would have needed  to pay,  ) (V E ) when 
his cost of performance is above  ) (V E (this happens with probability  )) ( ( 1 V E F - ) and 
Buyer’s value is  ) (V E (probability  )) ( ( V E g ) is less than Buyer’s expected gain from 
breach (damages she would have received,  ) (V E , minus her expected value of the good) 
when her value of performance is below  ) (V E  (this happens with probability  )) ( ( V E G ) 
and Seller’s cost  is  ) (V E (probability  )) ( ( V E f ), then the Buyer (contract designer) will 
lower the optimal breach threshold to below  ) (V E to encourage more breach from the 
Seller. 
2. Notice that our result is different from Stole (1992). Stole showed that the efficient 
stipulated damages are always under-compensatory ( and  thus  the penalty doctrine is 
justified). He showed in other words that  ) (
* * V E D p O O < + always holds. Yet, in our 
model this result does not always hold. If the condition is not satisfied we might have 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art71over-compensatory damages (even before considering the strategic effect of third parties, 
see Schwartz and Edlin (2003) for a concise summary of the literature). The difference 
between our paper and Stole's is due to the different informational structure and the new 
proposed  OER, which Stole does not consider.  
 
 
Interestingly, under OER, the breach threshold there can be more or less breaches than 
under RLR.  Lemma A4 determines the conditions at which OER will induce less breach 
than RLR.  
 
 
Lemma A4 If  ), (
* * V E D p O O ‡ + then OER contract induces less expected breach than 
RLR. 
Proof:  Under RLR, if  ) (
* * V E D p C R R = + > , i.e., with probability  )) ( ( 1 V E F -  the 
seller breaches. Under OER contract the Seller breaches only if  a = + >
* *
O O D p C  and 
a = + <
* *
O O D p V . This will happen with probability  ) ( )] ( 1 [ a a G F - . But 
)) ( ( 1 ) ( ))] ( ( 1 [ ) ( )] ( 1 [ V E F G V E F G F - < - £ - a a a .  QED. 
 
 
Comparison of Equilibrium Payoffs for OER and RLR 
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Proposition 1 
In a regime of double-sided uncertainty where  parties specific performance and 
liquidated damages clauses are honored,  OER is Pareto superior to RLR, if 
)) ( / ( )) ( / ( V E C C E V E V V E ‡ > ‡ .  
 
Proof: Let  x p V E D p O O O = = + ), ( , then the seller’s expected payoff is: 
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Let  0 =
S
O v , we have  ) ( )) ( ( ))] ( ( 1 [ ) ( )) ( ( ) (
) (
V E V E G V E F C CdF V E G C E p
C
V E
O - + - = ￿ . 
Since this price plus  O O p V E D - = ) (  guarantee the seller’s expected payoff is zero, it is 
a feasible contract. Plugging this specific contract into the buyer’s payoff function and 
simplifying, we get 
￿ ￿ + - - + =
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that Buyer’s expected valuation is greater than Seller’s expected cost conditional that 
both of them are over E(V), which is the optimal breach threshold under RLR. Under 
RLR, when Seller’s cost is over the threshold, he will breach and trade is not realized. 
2.  Proposition 1 states that  OER Pareto dominates RLR whenever Buyer’s mean-
valuation above the breach-threshold is higher than the Seller’s mean-costs above that 
threshold. Indeed, in that case, from the ex-ante perspective, performance is more likely 
to be efficient than breach. Under these circumstances shifting from RLR to  OER and 
thus providing the Buyer with the option to insist on performance is efficiency-
enhancing.  
3. In the special case of uniform distributions, where C is distributed ] , [ s s U S S + - m m , 
and V is distributed  ] , [ b b U B B + - m m , the condition stated in Proposition 1 can be 
reduced to:  b s S B - > - m m . This means that  OER dominates RLR whenever the 
difference between parties’ means is larger than half of the difference in their ranges. 
Observe that the range is a proxy for the uncertainty in the Buyer’s ultimate valuation and 
the Seller’s ultimate costs. Thus for OER to not dominate RLR, the Seller’s uncertainty 
should be larger than the Buyer’s uncertainty, and this excess uncertainty should be larger 
than the initial mean advantage that the Buyer has over the Seller.
26 The intuition for this 
result is simple. Observe that  OER leads to more performance than RLR. Given the 
Buyer’s larger ex-ante mean, this is a move in the right direction. Yet, sometimes the 
Seller’s range of costs can be so large, that he is likely to end up having very high costs. 
In that case is better not perform the contract. The condition  b s S B - > -m m  defines the 
balance between these two effects.  
4. Because neither of the legal regimes is unconditionally superior, courts should allow 
the parties to choose the type of legal regime they prefer. Specifically, the Buyer should 
be allowed to offer the Seller either an RLR-like take-it-or-leave it contract, with  
                                                  
26 Ex-ante, the buyer has always a larger mean-valuation then the Sellers’ mean costs. Otherwise, risk-
neutral parties would have never entered the contract in the first place.  
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressR R D p , , or an OER-like with  O O D p , . The Seller is indifferent as his expected payoff is 
always zero. But for the Buyer it does matter. As the Buyer can observe in Time 1 both 
distributions, she will prefer the  O O D p ,  contract whenever the condition stated in 
Proposition 1 is met, otherwise she will prefer the R R D p ,  contract. Buyer's choice of 
contracts renders this mechanism to be always Pareto superior to the current RLR regime. 
Proposition 2 summarizes: 
 
Proposition 2 
In a regime of double-sided uncertainty where parties’ specific performance and 
liquidated damages clauses are honored, the mechanism defined in comment (d) above is 
Pareto superior to RLR.  
 
 




Time Line- At Time 1, when the parties enter a contract, they do not know their 
exact valuation and cost, but only know their distributions.  At Time 2 the Seller, after 
learning his exact cost of performance, may decide to repudiate. At Time 3 there is a trial 
upon which the court learns about Buyer’s expected valuation. The Buyer learns her 
exact valuation only after trial at Time 3.5. At time 4 the Buyer decides whether to insist 
on performance or receive expectation damages.  
 
 
Under Regular Legal Regime (RLR), Seller has the right to breach if he pays the damages 
to the Buyer. We assume that the Buyer makes the Seller a take-it-or-leave-it offer with a 
fixed price,
R p , which is payable upon performance. In case of a breach, the court will 
determine the damages according to Buyer’s report of her anticipated value, 





R p . The Buyer reports her anticipated value, 
R V
~
,  before she learns her real 
ex-post, V. (The Buyer may need the contract good as an intermediate input to produce a 
consumer good whose uncertain demand is not yet to be seen in market, even though the 
seller may already know his cost of producing that input.) Since the seller gets 
R p -C if 
he performs and (–
R D )=
R p -
R V ~ if he breaches, he will breach if C>
R V ~ , and deliver 
otherwise.  
 
The Buyer will being evidence that will mislead the court to believe that her anticipated 
valuation is 
R V ~
, such that her expected payoff is maximized:  
 
 
R R R R R R R R R R














FOC:  0 ) ~ ( 1 ) ~ ( ] ~ ) ( [ = - + -
R R R V F V f V V E                                                    (12) 
 
Comments:  
1. Observe that the Buyer faces a trade-off when she reports her anticipated value to the 




R V F - ), then the Seller will breach and the Buyer wins higher damages. However, a 
higher reported valuation, and hence a higher damage payment, will discourage the Seller 
from breaching, in which case the Buyer only gets  ) (V E instead of a higher 
R V ~ . She will 
balance these two countervailing incentives when choosing her evidence. 
2. Observe that (12) implies that  ) (
~ *
V E V
R > .  
3. Numerical example. If both parties' valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution 
U[0, 100], then 




B v  If F is U[10,70], G is U[30,90], then 
* ~ R V =65 




B v  
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R R R R R R R R
S V V F C CdF p p V V F V C C E p V F v
R
~ )] ~ ( 1 [ ) ( )] ~ ( )][ ~ ( 1 [ )] ~ / ( )[ ~ (
~
- - - = - - - + £ - = ￿
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Remarks: 1. Buyer’s equilibrium payoff, 
* R
B v , is equal to the first best payoff if we 
replace 
* ~ R V  with V.  
1.  Observe that the Seller will breach whenever  ) (
~ *
V E V C
R > > . Thus, from the 
ex-ante perspective, there is under-breach. Recall that the previous model of 
liquidated damages induced efficient breach from the ex-ante perspective. (The 
Seller breached whenever  ) (
* * V E D p C R R = + > .) 
2.  From the ex-post perspective, there is under-breach if 
* ~R V V < , and over-breach 
if 
* ~ R V V > . Recall that the previous model of  liquidated damages that did not 
induce efficient breach from the ex-post perspective.  
















V F V d , which is  the inverse of the hazard rate. By the 
Monotone Hazard Rate assumption A1,  0 < ¢ d . Applying the implicit function 
theorem,  we can derive  from equation ( 13)  that 
)]
~
( 1 /[ 1 )] ( [ /
~ * * R R V V E V d ¢ - = ¶ ¶ .  0 < ¢ d  implies that 
) 1 , 0 ( )] ( [ /
~ *
˛ ¶ ¶ V E V
R , i.e., Buyer’s reported  valuation will increase with  ) (V E . 














V F V V E , we know that when Buyer’s  mean 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art71distribution  increases, the reported value increases as well, but the exaggeration 

















V V E V
-




Option to Enforce Contract 
 
Under Option to Eenforce Regime (OER ) the Buyer has an option to insist, upon breach, 
on performance. We assume that Buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer (
O p ) to the 
Seller. If the Seller repudiates the court will determine the damages according to Buyer’s 
report of her anticipated value, 
O V ~ , where 
O D =
O V ~ -
O p . The Buyer reports her 
anticipated value, 
O V ~ ,  before she learns her real ex-post, V. (As before, the Buyer may 
need the contract good as an intermediate input to produce a consumer good whose 
uncertain demand is not yet to be seen in market, even though the Seller may already 
know his cost of producing that input.)  
 
If the Seller p erforms, he gets C p
O - . If the Seller breaches he gets (-
O D ). Hence, 
if ‡ C
O V ~
, the Seller will prefer to breach, otherwise he will deliver. Observe that under 
OER, the Seller can no longer unilaterally decide on breach. If the Buyer insists on 
performance the Seller will have to perform. His expected payoff therefore when he 
attempts to breach is  ) )]( ~ ( 1 [ ) ~ )( ~   ( C p V G V p V G
O O O O O - - + - , and not (-
O D ). If the 
Buyer will insist on performance she will receive 
O p V - ; otherwise she receives 
O O O p V D - =
~ . Therefore, the Buyer will insist on delivery if 
O V V ~ ‡ , and agree to 
breach otherwise.  
 






O O O O
O O O O O O O
O O O
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p V VdG V V G V F V E V F
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                    (14)  
 
The Seller’s expected payoff is 
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Proof:  The implicit expression of 


















Assumption A2 ensures that under OER when facing an anticipatory breach and required 
to provide evidence about her valuation, the Buyer will inflate her valuation. If C is 
distributed  ] , [ s s U S S + - m m , and V is distributed  ] , [ b b U B B + - m m , Assumption A2 
means  2 / ) ( b s B S > - + m m . 
 
Lemma A7 
If Assumption A2 holds than   ) (
~ *
V E V
O >  
 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art71Proof:  Let  ) ~ ( )] ~ ( 1 [ ) ~ ( ] ~ ) ~ ( ) ( [ ) ~ (
~
O O O O O
V
V
O V G V F V f V V G V VdG V
O
- + - = D ￿ . By first-order 





O V . Observe that second-order conditions ensures  0 ) ~ ( < D¢
O V .  
 
 
When we plug into (16) E(V) we get:  
 
)) ( ( ))] ( ( 1 [ )) ( ( )] ( )) ( ( ) ( [ )) ( (
) (
V E G V E F V E f V E V E G V VdG V E
V E
V
- + - = D ￿  
 
Integration by parts lead to: 
 




)) ( ( 1
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But if Assumption A2 holds then:  
)
~






















Hence,  ) (
~ *
V E V





* * ~ ~ R O V V < . 
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that
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V f





V E V V V E
O < £  since 
* ~ O V  is an interior solution and less than  V . By the 




x F -  is decreasing inx. Since we suppose that 
















































V F V E
V f
V F V V V E - + < - + £ , a contradiction. Q.E.D 
 
Lemma A8 states that the OER contract provides the Buyer with fewer incentives to 




Lemma A12  Under OER  with Court-Imposed Expectation Damages,  
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Remarks 
1. Example. If both parties' valuations are drawn from the uniform distribution U[0,100], 
then  3 / 200 ~ *
=




B v  >9.375=
* R
B v . If F is U[10,70], G is U[30,90], then 
67 . 56 ~ *
=




B v  >20.626=
* R
B v .) 
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Proposition 3 
If Assumption A2 holds then a sufficient condition for OER to be Pareto superior to 





* * M M V C C E V V V E ‡ > ‡ .  
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With Assumption A2 satisfied, we know that 
* * ~ ~ ) (
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If the condition in Lemma is satisfied.   QED. 
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